Tag Archives: Global Politics

What kind of role does politics play in sport?

In a few days one of the world’s largest sporting events commences: the FIFA Football World Cup, this year held in Russia. With the recurrence of the World Cup in a new city every four years, we find ourselves debating how close or far politics should be from big soccer events.

Putin’s Russia (which is not all of Russia) is many things. Democracy, minority protection and international rule observance would not come to mind quickly when describing today’s Russia.

So when global soccer teams−with media, fans and commercial interests in tow−stream to Moscow and other Russian cities, we should think about how to frame this event:

Are these Putin’s games, or the festival for the youth of the world? Is this a gigantic media event, or will we encounter islands of authenticity? Can we separate the event from the Russian political context, or should we use the opportunity and talk on the spot about Crimea, Syria, and doping? And should political leaders of the world who care about values go to Russia and cheer for their teams, or not?

-Klaus Segbers

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How to deal with U.S. sanctions?

The current administration of the United States pursues the (not unprecedented) policy of ignoring substituting or bypassing global and international norms to a new level.  Recent examples include international trade treaties, the withdrawal from the Kyoto process, the pull-out from the 5 plus 1 Iran agreement, and the ongoing side-effects of these withdrawals.

It matters little whether current foreign policy is a continuation of traditional attitudes of exceptionalism, or if it is designed to win favour with certain domestic U.S. constituencies.

One of the more interesting issues is the phenomenon of secondary sanctions. This means that the U.S. administration does not only decide about which sanctions against who it wants to implement, but also tries to oblige companies from other countries to follow these ‘directions‘. If transnational companies do not accept this, they are threatened by sanctions themselves and may not be able to continue with commercial activities in the U.S., or with American partners.

While the global liberal order established after 1945 may be eroding, certain national regulations  are being preserved, or even strengthened, especially in the U.S.,  China  and to some extent, Russia.

This week’s questions are: a) is this acceptable? And b) what strategies and measures can be conceived to cope with this?


Klaus Segbers


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Germany, Cool?

Not long ago The Economist’s published a lead story entitled, ‘Germany is becoming more open and diverse. With the right leadership, it could be a model for the West.’ The lead commentary argued that ‘(m)any of the country’s defining traits – its ethnic and cultural homogeneity, conformist and conservative society, and unwillingness to punch its weight in international diplomacy – are suddenly in flux’ (April 14, 2018, p.9). Spanning 12 pages, the special report on Germany considers issues such as open and closed politics, the concept of ‘Heimat’, identity, social cleavages, and the advance of AI. The evolution of Germany into a reluctant and kind-of benign hegemon, and the state’s reconciliation with its history are also addressed, mostly in a sympathetic way.

This article forms the starting point for this week’s questions:

History never disappears. But are the horrors of the Holocaust and World War 2 becoming more distant, no longer immediately shaping current German policies? Is Germany becoming a ‘normal’ country, keeping its specific features but increasingly influential, with a clear liberal identity and taking over more responsibilities? And, if so, what does this signal to Germany’s neighbors? Ms Thatcher famously quipped after the collapse of the Berlin Wall:  “We’ve beaten the Germans twice. Now they’re back!” Giulio Andretti added “I love Germany so much that I prefer to see two of them”. Are these times gone for good? Is it acceptable for today’s Germany to define its political roadmap as pragmatically as most other countries are shaping theirs? Moreover, is there reason to assume that Germany may even belong to the few societies (maybe like Canada and the Scandinavian countries) serving as liberal role models, as the “West’s Last Stalwart of Enlightened Liberalism” (Haaretz, 11, 2017)?


Klaus Segbers

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Emotions in International Relations – Advantageous or Detrimental to Problem Solving?

Sitting in countless conference rooms, together with (all in all) 5.600 other participants of this year’s international Studies Association (ISA) Convention in San Francisco, it was interesting to see the broad and colourful scope of topics discussed. The style and format of presentations also varied greatly: from open forums for the discussion and exchange of ideas (resembling the university discussion groups of the Student Movement of the 1970s) to more formal seminars and first-class lectures.

A few of the sessions were devoted to discussing the role of emotions in politics, international relations, and diplomacy. The relevance of emotions to world politics has been given little credence in academic discussion in the past, and the inclusion of these sessions in a prestigious international convention was barely conceivable a few years ago.    The panel ‘Emotions and Diplomacy’, investigated how concepts such as empathy, memories, identity, nationalism, grievance, guilt and victimization influence our political landscape.

Following this debate this week’s question is: Are emotions in politics, both on the side of the public and/ or among decision makers and leaders, something which may and does contribute to solving conflicts? Or is this detrimental for problem solving?

Please name a few instances where emotional considerations had positive results in IR (they did contribute to problem solving), and also a few negative patterns. Equally how did emotions among ordinary people affect IR outcomes?

– Klaus Segbers


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What is the Effect of Mega Events on International Relations?

The Olympic Games in South Korea are just behind us, and the Paralympics will begin soon. Later this year, the World Soccer Championship will take place in the Russian Federation. In April, the annual Formula One car racing circus is going to be launched in Bahrain.

There is an ongoing debate on the pros and cons of mega-events like these: are the assumed advantages for the hosting countries (global attention, tourism, media as amplifiers, potential reconciliation between conflict partners) predominant, or is it the possible negative consequences (after-event empty sports venues, no lasting gains in employment, huge costs, sometimes corruption and negative environmental impact)?

In a couple of instances, prospective hosts have put the issue on a referendum, only to learn that a majority of the regional population concerned was voting an application down, or at least threatening to do so (Budapest 2017; Referendums have sunk five Olympic bids over the last two Olympic bidding cycles, and potential Olympic referendums ended the Boston bid and now many end the Budapest one. Some referendums curtailed a potential bid before it was submitted to the IOC, while others came at different stages during the candidature process.

In Germany, both Garmisch-Partenkirchen and Hamburg authorities experienced defeat by their respective populations. The IOC is experiencing problems finding suitable host states or regions, and was happy to find at least one bidder for 2022 and 2026, respectively.

So, are huge sports events like these not popular anymore? Or is it rather about a ‘Not in my backyard’ mood – people like to watch events on TV, but do not want them in their neighborhood?

The second aspect is about the original idea that during Olympic Games conflicts between states had to be put to rest, or at least for the duration of the games themselves. The apparent thaw between South and North Korea during the games in Pyeonchang seems to confirm that. The fact that Olympics were often boycotted seems to show the opposite (Berlin 1936, two boycotting countries;  Australia 1956 – eight countries; Japan 1964 – three countries; Canada 1976 – 34 countries; Soviet Union 1980 – 66 countries; USA 1984 – 18 countries; South Korea 1988 – 7 countries).

So this week’s question is: How do you assess the effect of big sports events on international politics?

– Klaus Segbers

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What Does the Present Era of New Weapons and Fear of Accidental Launches Bode for the Future?

In different countries all over the world, there are new and intensive efforts to strengthen (or achieve) new and better nuclear warfighting (or defensive) capabilities. This stands in striking opposition to at least the rhetoric of the first Obama administration, when the president (Potus) had declared that he was striving for a word free of nuclear weapons.

While this goal may be elusive (there is no technology so far that has been uninvented), the open and hidden efforts to achieve some access to a nuclear ‘button’ (the bigger the better) are now particularly intense. The U.S. is investing in modernization programs in the triple billion dollar range. New weapons and strategies are in the making in China and Russia. Iran and North Korea are trying to join the club, which may be followed by similar policies by Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Egypt and Turkey, as well as possibly Indonesia. India and Pakistan, Israel, the UK and France also are members of the club (though only five of all of them are also permanent members of the Security Council).

This week’s question is: Are we seeing here a ‘normal’ additional round of a competitive arms race, or does this indicate a new quality of insecurity on a broader scale? Do new weapons and warheads narrow the classical distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons? Is the danger of accidental launch growing? Has the Doomsday Clock’s hand rightly moved closer to midnight?

– Klaus Segbers

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When Does History Stop Fueling Current Interest in Compensation and Restitution?

History is a difficult thing. First of all, it is past. Second, there is rarely only one narrative reporting and reconstructing it – so, depending on the position of the observer or author, there are different, even conflicting stories on what actually happened. Third, history is often presented and used with clear current interests and purposes, which may come with twists, biases and inventions.

This helps explain why history still plays a role in current politics and IR debates. A few examples: The Polish government claimed (until quite recently) compensation from the German government for the destruction and atrocities inflicted by German forces in World War II. Currently, Namibia is suing Germany in New York, for slaughtering Hereros and other ethnic groups about 100 years ago, when Germany was a colonial power. Algeria is considering similar moves and is asking for an official apology from France for atrocities committed in the early 1960s, during the final years of France’s colonial rule. In the U.S., compensation is debated for slavery (which officially existed until 1863), and in Australia for the mistreatment of aborigines.

A separate, though equally difficult, issue is the question of restitution for property that was taken away from people or groups of people, mostly after regime changes – as, for example, the issue of compensating the few remaining Jews (or their families) for lost property after the Nazis were removed in 1945, and, and compensation for property appropriations committed by Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1917 and 1945, which came to the fore after those regimes collapsed in 1990.

So this week’s question is NOT about why, how and how long to produce memories and stories about history. It is about how much time must pass before his (or her) stories cannot be treated any longer as something fueling current interests in compensation and restitution?

 – Klaus Segbers

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“Partying Like It´s 1933”- What Did We Learn and Can We Do Better This Time Around?

There is an ongoing debate about the character of these years, 2017 and now 2018. Maybe stimulated by the recent change of years and nostalgic sentiments, there were some features added to this debate. The core issue suggested is that we are experiencing a major change in the global structure, an epochal rupture, a tipping point, or a Zeitenwende, away from the liberal global order established after the horror of the Second World War. The organizations and institutions of the Bretton Woods system are experiencing, so we learn, an erosion, a devaluation, and are partly supplemented by Chinese-led structures (AIIB, OBOR, etc.). The U.S. in particular is departing from organizations (UNESCO), and global treaties (Kyoto Protocol), giving up on trade regimes (TTIP, TPP) and customary rules (status of Jerusalem), and afflicting damage to other agreements (Iran Vienna agreement), reducing the credibility of established organizations (NATO), and addressing the EU with contempt and ASEAN with neglect. Although the Chinese are more polite, they may agree with the substance of a perceived or claimed need to build a new global (dis)order. Russia does not care much either way, violating rules if convenient. Most of the EU sticks to rules, but it is not united, losing with the UK an important member state, and is not strong enough to serve as a counterweight.

A second, more specific concern is the question of whether there are parallels between 1933 and 2017-18. What was the rise of National Socialism 85 years ago, is now, as some writers suggest, the rise of populism. One and a half years ago, Robert Kagan alerted the public with the piece ‘This is how fascism will come to America’. More recently, the President of the Australian Institute of International Affairs stated that ‘the global order that had shaped the world since the end of World War II was over’. The observer Alex Bayer wrote in Kyiv Post under the header ‘Partying like it’s 1933’ about a world that is ‘being launched upon some kind of destructive course and careening full speed toward as yet unknown disaster’, and sees a situation he compares ‘(i)n this respect … is similar to the year 1933 when the foundations of the subsequent momentous events in world history were laid but the events themselves were yet to take shape’.

The New York Times registers and comments on two new publications with the header ‘Will Democracy Survive President Trump? Two New Books Aren’t Not So Sure’. One of the authors, David Frum, who has a sound Republican background, is quoted as saying ‘if it’s potentially embarrassing to speak too soon, it can also be dangerous to wait too long’. USA Today published a piece by the former under-secretary of state Nicholas Burns under the title ‘America is on the brink of a historic break with Europe, thanks to Trump’.

It is very difficult during the course of ongoing events not to lose perspective. Very true. But most of the consequences of 1917, for example, were not quite anticipated, as was the trajectory of 1933. The end of the East-West conflict in 1989 surprised most professional pundits. The financial crashes of 2007-08 came over the world in a similar fashion. So this week’s question is: Do we think that we can do better now?

 – Klaus Segbers

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Nuclear Capable North Korea – Are the Risks Becoming Uncontrollable?

Most experts have converged on the belief that North Korea (DPRK) now has (a) the ability to produce nuclear warheads, (b) the ability to produce carrier systems (medium and long-range rockets), and, (c) the willingness – under certain circumstances, to use these weapons. No one is delighted by this, not even also China, which always carefully weighs the options of a DPRK collapsing- due to serious sanctions or a military strike against having the nukes available. In Asia, there are conflicting assessments, as there are in Western capitals.

The options include:

— accepting the DPRK as a member of the nuclear club, even without the safeguards of formal restraint;

— sending a clear signal, such as crippling sanctions and/or a nuclear strike;

— muddling through, in the manner of the last 15 years of policy, with the result we described above.

What’s your take?

-Klaus Segbers

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Red Lines and Blurred Lines – When Do We Go to War?

Rhetoric and deeds are escalating, both in Washington, D.C. and in Pyongyang. It is clear that the regime of Kim Jong-un is trying to achieve nuclear status by all available means. And it is equally clear that the different voices from the Trump administration do not add up to a clear strategy.

Red lines are mentioned, but vaguely, and bombastic declarations (‘fire and fury’) are alternating with diplomatic invitations to negotiate.

Meanwhile, the rest of the world is repeating the mantra that ‘there is only a diplomatic solution’. Similar words are used when it comes to China’s artificial reefs and new debates on sovereignty, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the continuing meddling in Ukraine’s affairs, which is a rather boring continuation of ordinary robbery.

The invitation to this week’s debate is to take positions on this mantra: That ‘there is no other solution’. Empirically, this is obviously wrong. There were and are military solutions to conflicts, and sometimes economic sanctions work as well. In addition, it is often not a good idea to take certain moves off the table, even when they are not preferred, because then an adversary can calculate how far the opponent will go in resisting him.

But to make things easier, let’s focus on the main problem: aside from matters regarding the DRPK, are there values or interests in the early 21st century for which it is legitimate (or even required) to go to war? Despite our sophisticated knowledge about escalatory risks and the disastrous effects of WMDs? If not, for what do we maintain armies, then?

– Klaus Segbers

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